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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
JULIE HARMON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No- 920463-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Julie Harmon appeals her conviction for 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 
1992), entered by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Utah, the Honorable Anne M. Stirba, presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(Supp. 1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
For reasons explained in the body of this brief, the 
State addresses the issues presented by defendant in reverse 
order, as follows: 
1. Did the trial court correctly rule that defendant's 
consent to a police search of her home was freely and voluntarily 
given? Furtherf was her consent sufficiently "attenuated- from 
possible earlier police misconduct, such that the fruits of the 
home search were not subject to the exclusionary rule? The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that a trial court's ruling of voluntary 
consent, and a ruling on whether such consent is "attenuated" 
from prior illegal police conduct, once the underlying facts are 
established, are both questions of law, reviewed without 
deference to the trial court. State v. Thurman, No. 910494, slip 
op. at 17-21 (Utah Jan. 7, 1993). 
2. Did the trial court correctly rule that a police 
officer's arrest of defendant for the offense of driving under a 
suspended license was not an improper "pretext" arrest? Because 
defendant does not challenge the accuracy of the trial court's 
fact findings, this question may legitimately be treated as one 
of law, reviewed without deference to the trial court. See State 
v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1044-50 (Utah App.), cert, granted, No. 
920319 (Utah Oct. 28, 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution are 
practically identical in their language. The former provision 
reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. S 41-1-17 (1988), in effect at the time 
of the events in question here, provided in pertinent part: 
2 
[P]eace officers, state patrolmen, and others 
duly authorized by the [motor vehicle] department 
or by law shall have power and it shall be their 
duty: 
(a) To enforce the provisions of this act and 
of all other laws regulating the registration or 
operation of vehicles or the use of the highways, 
(b) To make arrests upon view and without 
warrant for any violation committed in their 
presence of any of the provisions of this act or 
other law regulating the operation of vehicles or 
the use of the highways. 
. . . 
Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution reads: 
The powers of the government of the State of 
Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and 
the Judicial; and no person charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any functions 
appertaining to either of the others, except in 
cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
Other constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules pertinent to 
the resolution of this appeal will be contained in the body of 
this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As set forth in defendant's opening brief, this case 
involves a conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance. The conviction was entered upon defendant's guilty 
plea, whereupon another, lesser charge was dismissed (R. 95-102). 
Defendant's plea was conditional, under State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 
735 (Utah App. 1988), reserving the right to appeal the denial of 
her pretrial motion to suppress evidence (R. 95). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial court entered detailed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, supporting its denial of defendant's motion 
to suppress evidence (R. 104-108, copied in Opening Br. of 
Appellant, Appendix 2). In a signed memorandum decision (R. 79-
91, also copied .id.), the court found that defendant was not a 
credible witness at the motion hearing, and consistently credited 
the involved law officer's testimony over that of defendant (R. 
88-90). Defendant does not argue that any of those findings are 
clearly erroneous. Thus the State's fact recitation closely 
tracks the trial court's findings, adding supporting citations to 
the transcript of the motion to suppress hearing (R. 196-309), 
and to the transcript of the preliminary hearing (R. 311-65, 
admitted into the record at R. 126-27), as follows: 
On November 19, 1991, Detective Russo of the Metro 
Narcotics task force received an informant's tip that defendant 
was distributing narcotics from a single-family home in west Salt 
Lake County (R. 200-01, 313) (the informant is described at R. 
343-44). That evening, Russo went to the named address, where he 
encountered defendant as she was backing her car out of the 
driveway. Russo told defendant about the narcotics trafficking 
report, and asked if he could search her home (R. 202-03, 315-16, 
349). Defendant refused, stating that she was leaving to visit 
her father, who had recently suffered a heart attack; she then 
drove away (R. 203, 317, 349, 351). 
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Remaining by the home, Russo radioed to check on the 
status of defendant's driver's license, and was informed that her 
license was suspended (R. 204, 317, 350-51). Meanwhile, 
defendant drove around the block twice, passing the home (id..; R. 
305). Russo obtained assistance from a marked patrol officer, 
and stopped defendant nearby (R. 204-05, 317). 
Russo arrested defendant for driving on a suspended 
license (R. 205, 317, 352). Although assigned as a narcotics 
officer, Russo issued occasional traffic citations (R. 244-45). 
He had previously made several dozen stops of other persons for 
driving under suspension; of that number, he had effected full 
custodial arrests approximately a dozen times (R. 205-06, 233). 
The decision whether to make a custodial arrest for driving under 
suspension was, in practice, a matter of officer discretion (R. 
106, 235). 
Incident to this arrest, Russo searched defendant's 
purse and found controlled substances, apparently prescription 
drug pills that were mislabelled or not prescribed to defendant 
(R. 206-07, 317-18).x Russo gave defendant "Miranda" warnings, 
put her into his car, and began driving to jail. En route, 
defendant admitted that she had been afraid to let Russo into her 
*Russo testified that he "initiated a search and seizure 
arrest" (R. 206). However, that statement came on the heels of 
Russo's statement that he had already arrested defendant (R. 205). 
Also, at the preliminary hearing, Russo testified that upon 
arresting defendant, he conducted a "search of her purse instant to 
that arrest" (R. 317). Thus Russo's testimony does not necessarily 
show that he arrested defendant in order to search her; it equally 
suggests that Russo merely was less than ideally articulate in 
describing his action. 
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home, because she had sold drugs in the past, and still had 
paraphernalia in the home (R. 207, 328). She told Russo that if 
he would drive her back home, she would let him inside to 
retrieve those items (R. 208, 251). 
Defendant offered to sign a consent form, allowing 
Russo to search her home (R. 209). Russo promised her no benefit 
in return for her consent, and told her that she would probably 
go to jail anyway (R. 210, 328-29, 354-56). He further told 
defendant that he wished to avoid any appearance of using 
coercion to obtain her consent, and that he would simply apply 
for a search warrant based upon the information he already had 
(R. 208-09, 328-29). Nevertheless, defendant again said that she 
would consent, and even "insisted" upon returning to her home to 
search it (R. 209-10, 328-29, 356). Summoning assistance, Russo 
drove back to defendant's home (R. 209-11). 
Arriving at the home, Russo "Mirandized" defendant 
again. Defendant signed a written form consenting to a search of 
her home (R. 211-12, 330, 355-56). The consent form (State's 
Exhibit 1, reproduced at Appendix 3 to Br. of Appellant) stated 
that defendant had "been informed of my rights per Miranda not to 
have a search made of the premises, hereinafter mentioned, 
without a search warrant, [andJ of my right to refuse consent to 
such a search . . .." It further specified that the search was 
for the purpose of a narcotics investigation (id.). 
After defendant signed the consent form, Russo became 
concerned about defendant's dog, inside the home; he told 
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defendant that he would have to shoot the dog if it attacked the 
searching officers (R. 212, 239-40, 247, 355). Defendant was 
allowed into the home ahead of the officers, and she removed the 
dog to the back yard. Thus the officers never actually 
endangered the dog (R. 212-13, 248). 
Russo and the assisting officers then performed the 
home search, with defendant's cooperation (R. 213-14, 257-58). 
Defendant herself retrieved various items of drug paraphernalia 
and illegal drugs from beneath her living room sofa, and turned 
them over to the officers (R. 213-14, 248, 332). The fruits of 
the home search included methamphetamine, marijuana, and 
paraphernalia used for "cutting" drugs (R. 253, 263-65, 333). 
After the search, Russo decided against taking 
defendant directly to jail (R. 214). Nor did he cite defendant 
for driving under suspension (R. 357). Instead, Russo left her 
at home, with instructions to call him the following morning 
regarding the contemplated drug charges (R. 214-15). Defendant 
was formally arrested about two weeks later (R. 5, 14). 
Trial Court Disposition 
Defendant was charged by information with three 
controlled substance violations (R. 6-8). Count Three dealt with 
the prescription narcotics found in defendant's purse incident to 
her arrest (R. 8, 318-25); that charge, however, was dismissed 
following the preliminary hearing (R. 7, 365). Count Two was 
misdemeanor-level marijuana possession; that charge was dismissed 
pursuant to defendant's plea bargain (R. 7, 98, 102). Defendant 
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conditionally pleaded guilty only to Count One, felony-level 
possession of methamphetamine (R. 6, 95). That drug, again, had 
been recovered during the home search. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court need not reach the unsettled "pretext" issue 
here, for this case can be resolved without deciding whether 
defendant's arrest was "pretextual." Instead, this Court can 
simply examine whether defendant's consent to search her home was 
voluntary, and not arrived at through exploitation of the arrest. 
The record here demonstrates that defendant's consent was valid 
under this "attenuation" test. She was not forced to consent, 
and knew of her right to refuse consent. Even if the arrest 
might be deemed improper, it was not "flagrantly" so, given that 
it was authorized by statute, and took place in advance of this 
Court's explanation of "pretext" doctrine. Further, defendant 
actively volunteered her search consent to Detective Russo, 
breaking the causal connection between the arrest and the 
consent. Thus the fruits of the consent search were properly 
admitted into evidence. 
If pretext analysis is undertaken, Detective Russo's 
subjective "motivation" for arresting defendant was irrelevant 
under controlling law. Next, the offense of driving under 
suspension, the assigned reason for defendant's arrest, is not a 
"minor" offense. It is a willfully-committed, serious offense 
for which defendant should have been arrested; accordingly, 
pretext analysis is inappropriate. Finally, even though Russo 
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did not "usually" arrest persons caught driving under suspension, 
such arrests were not so uncommon that a reasonable officer would 
have necessarily decided to not arrest defendant. 
Pretext doctrine may have a legitimate, limited place 
in search and seizure law regarding arrests. However, the same 
criticisms apply to the doctrine as regards both temporary 
detentions and arrests. In both contexts, pretext doctrine is 
unnecessary, confusing, and ultimately subjective in application, 
adequately guiding neither police officers nor reviewing courts. 
Here the doctrine also violates Utah's constitutional separation-
of-powers provision. If not abandoned altogether, the doctrine 
should be restricted in its application only to arrests that are 
grossly out of line with usual police practice. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
The Utah Supreme Court has granted certiorari review of 
State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App.), cert, granted, No. 
920319 (Utah Oct. 28, 1992), wherein this Court adopted "pretext 
doctrine" as a constitutional principle. On certiorari, the 
State will argue that pretext doctrine has no legitimate place in 
search and seizure law, at least in the context of non-arrest, 
temporary detentions. The extent to which the supreme court's 
resolution of this question will also affect pretext doctrine in 
the arrest context, presented here, cannot be predicted. 
It seems prudent to avoid a potential conflict with the 
supreme court's pending decision of the "pretext" question. 
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Further, "judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching 
constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding 
them." State v. Thurman, No. 910494, slip op. at 7 (Utah Jan. 7, 
1993) (quotation and citation omitted). There is no need to 
reach the "pretext" issue here. Instead, following the supreme 
court's lead in Thurman, slip op. at 7, 23, the question of 
whether the items seized from defendant's home were properly 
admitted into evidence against her can be answered through 
"attenuation" analysis, without addressing the constitutional 
propriety of her arrest. 
Therefore, the State addresses the issues presented by 
defendant in reverse order: First, the State will show that 
defendant's consent to her home search was both voluntary and not 
achieved by exploitation of her arrest, such that the fruits of 
that search were properly admitted into evidence even if the 
arrest was improper. Then the "pretext" question will be 
addressed, and pretext analysis will be shown not to be satisfied 
here. Finally, the State will review the problems posed by 
pretext doctrine, arguing that it should be abandoned or at least 
greatly restricted in its application. 
10 
POINT ONE 
REGARDLESS OF ANY PROBLEM WITH HER ARREST, 
DEFENDANT'S SUBSEQUENT CONSENT TO THE HOME 
SEARCH WAS BOTH VOLUNTARY AND ATTENUATED FROM 
THE ARREST, SUCH THAT THE FRUITS OF THAT 
SEARCH ARE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE. 
A. Only the Home Search is in Issue. 
As a preliminary matter, the scope of this appeal must 
be understood. Defendant's plea-supported conviction is only for 
possession of methamphetamine—contraband that was found upon the 
search of her home. The charge of unlawful possession of 
prescription medications, arising from the earlier, incident-to-
arrest search of defendant's purse, was dismissed following the 
preliminary hearing (R. 7, 365). 
Therefore, the question of the propriety of the search 
conducted incident to defendant's arrest has no direct bearing 
upon the parties' respective rights regarding defendant's 
conviction. Therefore, the question is moot, see Burkett v. 
Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989), and under Rule 37, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure (mootness), this Court ought not to 
review it. 
Because the search incident to defendant's arrest is a 
moot question, the State's acknowledgment that pretext doctrine 
may have a place in the arrest context (Opening Br. of Appellant 
at 11 n.2) is less significant to this case than it might 
otherwise be. This is because any possible misuse of misdemeanor 
arrest power here did not directly yield evidence that might be 
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subject to the exclusionary rule under search and seizure law. 
Only the subsequent home search yielded such evidence. 
B. The Contraband in Defendant's Home was Seized 
Pursuant to Consent that was Both Voluntary and 
Not Obtained by Exploitation of her Arrest. 
In State v. Thurman, No. 910494 (Utah Jan. 7, 1993), 
the Utah Supreme Court clarified and reaffirmed the place of 
"attenuation" analysis, earlier set forth in State v. Arroyo, 796 
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), in search and seizure law. Under that 
analysis, evidence seized pursuant to a consensual search is 
admissible, even if the consent follows questionable or illegal 
police conduct, if two conditions are met: First, the consent 
must be voluntary, that is, not coerced. Second, the consent 
must not be obtained by exploitation of the earlier police 
conduct. Thurman, slip op. at 7; accord State v. Robinson, 797 
P.2d 431, 437 & n.7 (Utah App. 1990). The supreme court held 
that both conditions present questions of law that, once the 
underlying facts are established, are reviewed without deference 
to trial court rulings. Thurman, slip op. at 21.2 
Thurman was decided only under the fourth amendment. 
Slip op. at 3 n.4. On appeal, defendant does not argue that 
attenuation analysis should proceed differently under Article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution than it does under the fourth 
amendment (Opening Br. of Appellant at 25-31). Accordingly, the 
2Contra Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S. 
Ct. 2041, 2047-48 (1973) ("the question whether a consent to a 
search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or 
coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be 
determined from the totality of all the circumstances"). 
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State limits its attenuation analysis to fourth amendment law, as 
set forth in Thurman and other cases applying the analysis, see 
id. Under that analysis, both conditions for attenuated search 
consent are satisfied here. 
1. Voluntary Consent. 
Satisfaction of the voluntariness condition is 
determined "from the totality of all the circumstances" 
surrounding the search consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218, 227, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2048 (1973); accord Robinson, 797 
P.2d at 437 & n.7. Defendant identifies the pertinent factors 
for reviewing a voluntariness determination, set forth in State 
v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980), and in State v. 
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990). She correctly notes that 
the burden is upon the State to satisfy the Whittenback and Webb 
standards in the trial court. Because the trial court 
effectively ruled that the State met that obligation, the burden 
of persuasion, on appeal, now rests with defendant. She has not 
carried her burden. 
In Webb, this Court listed three factors for 
determining voluntary search consent: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony 
that the consent was "unequivocal and specific" 
and "freely and intelligently given"; 
(2) the government must prove consent was given 
without duress or coercion, express or implied; 
and 
(3) the courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights and there must be convincing 
evidence that such rights were waived. 
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790 P.2d at 82 (quotations and citations omitted). The third 
factor actually describes the State's trial court burden, and 
otherwise repeats the first factor, regarding "clear" and 
"specific" evidence supporting voluntariness. The State 
therefore addresses the first and third Webb factors together. 
Defendant complains that the written consent form that 
she signed is not clear and specific, but "garbled" (Opening Br. 
of Appellant at 29). However, the form states that defendant was 
informed of her "right not to have a search made of the premises, 
hereinafter mentioned, without a Search Warrant," and of her 
"right to refuse to consent to such a search" (Appendix 3, 
Opening Br. of Appellant). This is, nearly verbatim, the consent 
form language quoted by the Utah Supreme Court in Thurman, slip 
op. at 24, without criticism. Imparted here in three clear, 
typewritten lines, it is difficult to imagine how any English-
speaking adult could fail to grasp its meaning. 
Besides the signed consent form, Detective Russo's 
testimony—both presumably and explicitly credited over that of 
defendant (R. 88-90), ££. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 
(Utah 1991)—revealed that defendant not only offered her consent 
to the home search, but that she repeatedly and even insistently 
did so (R. 209-10, 328-29, 356). Further, she did this on the 
heels of her "Miranda" warnings, admonishing her to remain silent 
or risk legal peril in speaking (R. 207, 211-12). Along with the 
signed consent form, a more specific and clear expression of 
search consent can scarcely be imagined. 
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The remaining Webb factor focuses on the question of 
duress or police coercion in obtaining a consent. The pertinent 
subfactors are: 
(1) the absence of a claim of authority to search 
by the officers; 
(2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the 
officers; 
(3) a mere request to search; 
(4) cooperation by [the subject]; and 
(5) the absence of deception or trick on the part 
of the officer• 
Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 106. 
Without clear record citation, and apparently relying 
upon her own, discredited testimony, defendant seems to argue 
that Detective Russo falsely claimed that he could easily obtain 
a search warrant, such that the first and fifth Whittenback 
subfactors were not satisfied (Br. of Appellant at 8, 29-31). In 
fact, Russo expressed no view toward defendant regarding whether 
a search warrant might be obtained when he first encountered her 
in her driveway and asked for search consent (R. 226-27). He 
told her that he would need either a warrant, or defendant's 
consent—which she could refuse, to search the home (R. 350). 
Further, Russo squarely denied even hinting, after 
defendant's arrest, that she could avoid going to jail if she 
consented to a search her home (R. 237-38, 354). Indeed, he 
initially refused defendant's proffered consent, voicing concern 
about seeming to coerce her, stating that he would prefer to 
apply for a warrant, and telling defendant that she would receive 
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no favor in return for her consent (R. 208-10). This hardly 
amounts to trickery or false authority under Whittenback.3 
Nor did defendant succumb to an improper "exhibition of 
force" in giving her search consent. She acknowledged this in 
the written consent form, and no other facts compel a contrary 
conclusion. The facts that defendant was under arrest and 
handcuffed when she proffered the consent, for example, do not 
establish coercion under Whittenback. State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 
1268, 1273-74 (Utah App. 1990). Any threat to defendant's dog 
was irrelevant, for the trial court explicitly found that mention 
of shooting the animal was made only after defendant had already 
given the consent (R. 106, 239). Nor does the possible presence 
of four police officers, when defendant was stopped for driving 
under suspension, necessarily constitute a coercive show of 
force. Cf:. Bobo, 803 P. 2d at 1270-71 (home entry by at least 
four officers; search consent held voluntary). 
Nor does the officer conduct in this case approach that 
condemned, through dictum, in Thurman. There six officers 
improperly broke into a home, weapons drawn, to serve a search 
warrant, rousting the defendant naked from his bed, handcuffing 
him, and bloodying his nose in the process. Thurman, slip op. at 
21-22. Similarly, contrary to the situation in Robinson (quoted 
in Opening Br. of Appellant at 31), defendant here was not 
3By the time defendant proffered her search consent to Russo, 
she had, upon receiving "Miranda" warnings, already admitted her 
history of drug dealing, and the presence of drug paraphernalia in 
her home (R. 106, 207). Given this, it strongly appears that Russo 
would have obtained a warrant, had he then sought one. 
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subjected to a false claim of authority to detain her or conduct 
a search; again, she was informed—repeatedly—of her right to 
refuse search consent. Thus no improper atmosphere of 
intimidation was created by Russo. 
In sum, defendant's assertion that "Russo was very 
forceful," and that she "was very susceptible to his force" 
(Opening Br. of Appellant at 30) cannot prevail.4 Instead, the 
record amply supports a conclusion that there was even less than 
a "mere request" for search consent under Whittenback once 
defendant was arrested. In spontaneously proffering her consent, 
defendant also cooperated with Russo, under Whittenback. 
Finally, Russo's use of a signed consent form, wherein 
defendant acknowledged her right to refuse consent, supports 
voluntariness in a manner that exceeds current constitutional 
requirements. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229-33, 93 S. Ct. at 
2048-50; Bobo, 803 P.2d at 1272-73. Under all the circumstances, 
then, the trial court's ruling that defendant voluntarily 
consented to the home search was correct. 
2. No Exploitation of the Arrest. 
Turning to the second condition for a valid consent 
search, attenuated from questionable police conduct, it must be 
^Defendant's claim that she was under duress because of her 
father's recent heart attack (Opening Br. of Appellant at 28) was 
also rejected by the trial court (R. 89). Defendant testified that 
she did go visit her parents, who lived "just a few blocks" away, 
after her first encounter with Russo (R. 281). When she arrived at 
her parents' home, however, defendant learned that her father "had 
just taken off with one of his friends to go for a ride, to go look 
around, and go elk hunting" (R. 282). 
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decided whether defendant's consent, although voluntary, was 
achieved through exploitation of her arrest. As guided by 
Thurman, three factors apply: These are the "purpose and 
flagrancy" of the questionable police conduct, the "temporal 
proximity" of the police conduct and the consent, and "the 
presence of intervening circumstances" between the police conduct 
and the consent. Thurman, slip op. at 9; Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 
690-91 n.4; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S. Ct. 
2254, 2261-62 (1975). 
Although the trial court made no "non-exploitation" 
ruling, appellate courts often conduct this part of attenuation 
analysis de novo, when the record permits it. E.g.; Thurman, 
slip op. at 23; State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 151 (Utah App.) 
(citing Brown), petition for cert, pending. No. 910218 (Utah Oct. 
4, 1991). On the record of this case, it can readily be seen 
that defendant's search consent was not achieved through 
exploitation of her arrest. 
Purpose and Flagrancy 
Beginning with the "purpose and flagrancy" inquiry, 
Detective Russo's encounter with defendant was initiated for the 
purpose of investigating alleged narcotics trafficking. Clearly, 
Russo remained interested in investigating this offense 
throughout the events in question here. However, that purpose 
did not negate the legitimacy of acting upon the new purpose that 
arose when Russo discovered that defendant's driver's license was 
suspended. In fact, given the panoply of serious offenses that 
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can lead to license suspension, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-2-127 & 
-128 (Supp. 1992), it was not only prudent, but desirable, for 
Russo to investigate the offense of driving under suspension. 
Defendant seemingly complains that Detective Russo's 
initial encounter with her, in her driveway, was somehow 
improper. Not so. "An officer may approach a citizen at anytime 
[sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained 
against his [or her] will." State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 
(Utah 1987) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Russo clearly did 
not overstep the limits of such a "level one" encounter, given 
that defendant freely announced her intention to leave, and was 
in fact allowed to do so (R. 105). 
Defendant also distorts the nature of Russo's initial 
questions. She claims that Russo "accused her of being a rumored 
'drug lord' and of having 'all the drugs in Columbia' in her 
house" (Opening Br. of Appellant at 27). In fact, Russo's 
approach was far less accusatory than defendant would have this 
Court believe. He simply commented upon the tip given to him by 
his informant: "I said the allegations suggested that she was 
such a big dope dealer that all the drugs in Columbia would be in 
her house" (R. 229, 348). This was hardly improper, let alone 
flagrantly so, in the context of the "level one" encounter. 
Defendant's arrest presents the only questionable 
police conduct, assailed by her as "pretextual." However, the 
arrest cannot be deemed "flagrantly" improper. For one thing, it 
was authorized by statute. That statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-
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17 (1988), part of Utah's now-rewritten Motor Vehicle Act, stated 
in pertinent part: 
[P]eace officers, state patrolmen, and others 
duly authorized by the [motor vehicle] department 
or by law shall have power and it shall be their 
duty: 
(a) To enforce the provisions of this act and 
of all other laws regulating the registration or 
operation of vehicles or the use of the highways. 
(b) To make arrests upon view and without 
warrant for any violation committed in their 
presence of any of the provisions of this act or 
other law regulating the operation of vehicles or 
the use of the highways. 
Because section 41-1-17 stated that officers shall make 
arrests for Motor Vehicle Act violations, Russo's discretion was 
legislatively directed against merely citing defendant for 
driving under suspension, a class C misdemeanor under Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-2-136 (Supp. 1991).5 Accord State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 
1040, 1053 (Utah App. 1992) (Russon, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). Section 41-1-17 does not appear to be 
constitutionally infirm, and "[p]olice are charged to enforce 
laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional." 
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2632 
(1979). Suppression of evidence derived from officer adherence 
to a statute serves no legitimate deterrent value. .Id. n.3; 
3In the rewritten Motor Vehicle Act, effective in 1992, 
section 41-1-17 was replaced by Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-la-107, 41-3-
105(8)(a) (Supp. 1992). Those provisions lack the mandatory 
"shall" arrest language of section 41-1-17, applicable at the time 
of defendant's 1991 arrest, except for certain offenses not 
appearing to include driving under suspension. It thus appears 
that the power to make an arrest for driving under suspension now 
falls within the permissive "may" language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-
7-2 (1990). 
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Thurman, slip op. at 9- Compare Sims, 808 P.2d at 144-45, 151 
(suppression ordered where no statute authorized the challenged 
police conduct). 
Additionally, there is no sign that Russo exceeded the 
scope of activities that normally attend a custodial arrest. In 
contrast, the United States Supreme Court found flagrant 
misconduct in a gunpoint arrest, unsupported by probable cause, 
that gave the "appearance of having been calculated to cause 
surprise, fright, and confusion." Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S. 
Ct. at 2262. Thus the arrestee's subsequent incriminating 
statements were suppressed. No similarly extreme conduct 
attended this arrest, supported by undisputed probable cause to 
believe that defendant was driving under suspension (R. 85). 
Finally, it is significant that this 1991 arrest 
predated this Court's Lopez opinion by over five months. To the 
extent that opinion may now guide police officers in avoiding 
"pretextual" behavior, such guidance was lacking at the time of 
this stop. Having conducted this arrest in conformity with then-
existing statutory and case law, Detective Russo cannot be said 
to have committed flagrant misconduct by failing to follow not-
yet-existent "pretext" guidelines. 
Temporal Proximity 
Turning to temporal proximity of the arrest and the 
consent, this factor is less helpful in attenuation analysis 
here. See Sims, 808 P.2d at 151 & n.19 (time ranging from "brief 
conversation" to two hours not significant for attenuation). The 
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time to travel some seventy to ninety blocks, in police custody 
(Opening Br. of Appellant at 6), does not, by itself, appear 
highly significant. 
Intervening Circumstances 
However, the time between the arrest and the consent 
was sufficient for defendant herself to create a major 
intervening circumstance. This was her spontaneous search 
consent offer, even over Detective Russo's initial reluctance. 
See State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 705 (Utah App. 1992) 
(intervening circumstances found, despite short time passage 
after improper stop, where the defendant "voluntarily extended 
the encounter" after he was free to leave). The trial court 
found that defendant proffered her consent at least twice before 
Russo accepted it (R. 106). C£. State v. Miller, 829 P.2d 132, 
135 (Utah App.) (confession was admissible where record showed 
that the jailed defendant may have initiated the negotiation that 
produced it), cert, denied. No. 920255 (Utah Aug. 17, 1992). She 
gave her consent not only after "Miranda" warnings, but upon 
further warning that she could expect no favor in return for it 
(R. 106). The consent form, as in Thurman, slip op. at 24, again 
apprised defendant of her right to refuse consent. 
Defendant's spontaneous consent offer, plus the absence 
of "flagrant" officer misconduct, thus broke the chain of 
causation between her arrest and the consent. Phrased 
differently, these factors "purged" any possible "taint" of the 
questioned arrest from defendant's voluntary search consent, 
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under Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690. Thus even if the arrest might be 
held improper, the fruits of the subsequent consensual search 
were properly admitted into evidence. 
POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT'S ARREST SHOULD NOT BE HELD 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER "PRETEXT DOCTRINE." 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed under the 
attenuation analysis in Point One of this brief. The State takes 
this opportunity, however, to respond to the "pretext" argument 
in defendant's opening brief. First, the State will show that 
pretext analysis, as set forth in State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040 
(Utah App.), cert, granted, No. 920319 (Utah Oct. 28, 1992), does 
not invalidate this otherwise-lawful arrest. Next, the State 
reviews and renews its argument for rejection—or at least close 
limitation—of pretext doctrine.6 
A. Pretext Analysis Does not Invalidate this Arrest. 
Consistent with its prior position, the State 
acknowledges that an arrest, inherently highly intrusive, raises 
more justification for adoption of pretext doctrine than does a 
temporary, "level two" detention or traffic stop. Cf.. State v. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (describing 
three types of police-citizen encounters). However, even 
assuming the doctrine to be valid in the arrest context presented 
here, it cannot help this defendant. 
6Besides arguing against the doctrine in Lopez, 831 P.2d at 
1044, the State urged this Court to reject it in State v. Cruz, 838 
P.2d 83, 84 n.l (Utah App. 1992). Both Lopez and Cruz, however, 
involved temporary detentions, rather than full custodial arrests. 
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1. Subjective Intent. 
Utilizing the "illegal motivation" language of Lopez, 
defendant argues at length that Detective Russo's desire to 
investigate her suspected drug dealing is dispositive, requiring 
this Court to hold that she was "pretextually," and therefore 
unconstitutionally, arrested for driving under suspension 
(Opening Br. of Appellant at 13-24). The State agrees that the 
repeated reference to "illegal motivation" in Lopez appears to 
invite analysis of officer subjective intent, even though the 
majority opinion purports to hold otherwise. 
However, in a post-Lopez opinion, issued by a panel 
that included two members of the Lopez panel, this Court 
clarified that subjective police "motivation" is not part of 
pretext analysis. That opinion, State v. Cruz, 838 P.2d 83 (Utah 
App. 1992), states: "The question posed in a pretext stop 
analysis is whether a reasonable officer, considering the 
totality of the circumstances, would have made the stop." 838 
P.2d at 84 (citing Lopez. 831 P.2d at 1044; emphasis in 
original). The Court then reiterated, "Were the officer's 
subjective motivation the key factor, a defendant could use this 
improper motivation as an excuse to escape the consequences of an 
otherwise valid and reasonable stop." Id. (quoting Lopez, 831 
P.2d at 1047). 
Cruz, clarifying Lopez, thus squarely holds that 
"improper" or "illegal" thoughts and motivations entertained by 
police officers do not invalidate an otherwise proper detention. 
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No good reason exists to hold otherwise in the context of an 
arrest. Therefore, whatever "improper" thoughts Detective Russo 
entertained in arresting defendant cannot be used by her to avoid 
the consequence of her otherwise valid arrest. 
Quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 98 S. Ct. 
1717 (1978), defendant illuminates a legitimate role for 
"motivation" inquiry in assessing the validity of police behavior 
under search and seizure law: "We . . . have little doubt that 
as a practical matter the judge's assessment of the motives of 
the officers may occasionally influence his judgment regarding 
the credibility of the officers' claims with respect to what 
information was or was not available to them at the time of the 
incident in question." 436 U.S. at 139 n.13, 98 S. Ct. at 1724 
n.13 (emphasis added) (quoted more fully in Opening Br. of 
Appellant at 22-23). 
Scott thus teaches that a desire to investigate some 
other offense can be very relevant in deciding whether the 
assigned grounds for detaining or arresting an individual were 
actually supported by observed facts. No such credibility 
problem is presented here, for defendant never challenged Russo's 
assertion that he did, in fact, observe her to be driving under 
suspension. The assigned ground for arresting defendant, then, 
existed beyond dispute. 
2. No "Minor Offense." 
The Lopez panel stated that pretext doctrine applies 
only to "minor" law violations. Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1050 n.17 
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("Only a small minority of traffic stop cases implicate the 
pretext doctrine . . . " ) ; accord United States v. Guzman, 864 
F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988). In Cruz, the offense of 
speeding at sixty miles per hour in a residential area was held 
not to be a minor violation; thus pretext analysis was 
"irrelevant and inapposite" to that case, 838 P.2d at 85, 
The offense of driving under suspension, for which 
defendant was stopped here, is not "minor." It is not the kind 
of offense that might be committed inadvertently, as might a turn 
signal problem. Yet in State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah 
App. 1990), and State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah App. 1989), 
this Court upheld stops for turn signal problems, implicitly 
deeming them "not minor." Driving under suspension, however, is 
not even an offense that, like speeding, might be committed 
negligently or recklessly. 
Instead, driving under suspension is a deliberate 
violation of a legally-binding order to not drive an automobile. 
The offense thus contains an element of willfulness that is 
clearly present here, for defendant cannot plausibly allege that 
she somehow forgot that her license had been suspended when she 
decided to drive her automobile. Driving under suspension 
therefore cannot be a minor offense, compared to turn signal 
violations, implicitly held "not minor" by this Court, or even 
compared to many speeding violations. 
Nor can it be seriously contended that driving under 
suspension is too minor an offense to justify an arrest. A 
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rather severe sanction, license suspension results from rather 
severe prior driving problems. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-2-127 & 
-128 (Supp. 1992) (offenses including, among others, negligent 
homicide, reckless driving, and failure to prove financial 
responsibility (insurance), can or may lead to suspension). As a 
matter of policy, it seems entirely proper—even preferable—to 
presume that a driver whose license has been suspended presents a 
danger to the public, posed by the underlying problems that led 
to the suspension. If such a person nonetheless flouts the 
directive to not drive, the only recourse left, to protect the 
public safety, would therefore lie in physically preventing that 
person from driving. 
"An officer is not required to ignore a traffic 
violation because it occurs in a high-crime area." Smith, 781 
P.2d at 883. Similarly, it is hard to imagine that Detective 
Russo was required to ignore defendant's offense of driving under 
suspension just because he also suspected her of another crime. 
If Russo erred here, he did so by releasing defendant after 
arresting her. She should have been confined, as a presumptively 
unsafe driver, to protect the public safety. In avoiding 
confinement, defendant merely received an undeserved benefit, of 
which she ought not complain. 
3. "Usual Practice." 
If this Court agrees that driving under suspension is 
not a minor offense, pretext analysis is inappropriate under 
Lopez and Cruz. If nevertheless analyzed, the State must agree 
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with defendant that while the officers in this case commonly 
stopped and cited people for driving under suspension, they 
arrested only a minority of such people (Opening Br. of Appellant 
at 15). Thus this arrest did not, strictly speaking, amount to 
"usual" practice. It might therefore be deemed a "pretextual" 
arrest, that is, one that a "reasonable officer" would not make. 
See Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1048 (explaining that reasonable officer 
practice may be measured by actual officer's "usual practice"). 
However, it does not appear that the practice of 
arresting persons caught driving under suspension was so rare as 
to be deemed "unusual" or otherwise wholly aberrant: roughly 
one-fourth to one-third of such offenders were arrested (R. 205-
06, 233). Therefore, it ought not be said that a reasonable 
officer would have necessarily not arrested defendant for that 
offense. As set forth earlier, there are sound reasons to hold 
that officers should arrest and confine persons caught driving 
under suspension. Accordingly, this Court should hold, if it 
reaches the question at all, that this was not an improper 
"pretextual" arrest, for it was not unusual for the involved 
officers to make arrests for the reason assigned here. 
Defendant will complain that the State is diluting the 
apparent Lopez "usual practice" standard for reasonable officer 
behavior, into one of "not unusual practice." Perhaps so. 
However, the Lopez majority only distinguished between offenses 
for which the involved officer "routinely" detains individuals, 
and those for which the officer had "never before" done so. 831 
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P.2d at 1049. The opinion therefore leaves room for a somewhat 
lenient "not unusual," or even a "not unheard-of," standard by 
which reasonable officer conduct, and therefore the question of 
pretextual behavior, might be assessed. 
The reason for adopting a relatively lenient "pretext" 
standard relates to the social cost of suppressing evidence, by 
subverting the truthseeking process, and in letting criminals go 
free. Quite frankly, such cost should be due only when police 
officers widely deviate from usual, acceptable conduct. Here, 
based upon the evidence presented in defendant's motion to 
suppress, it does not appear that Detective Russo widely deviated 
from usual practice when he chose to arrest defendant, rather 
than merely citing her: this was not the type of arrest that he 
had "never before" made. The cost of suppressing evidence, 
seized as an indirect result of the arrest, therefore outweighs 
the value in holding defendant accountable for the felony drug 
offense, of which she is admittedly guilty. 
Defendant also implies that arrests for driving under 
suspension were "usual" officer practice only for detainees who 
were, additionally, driving under the influence (Opening Br. of 
Appellant at 15). This implication arises from defense counsel's 
cross-examination of Detective Russo, who could not say how many 
of his driving-under-suspension arrests also involved driving 
under the influence, and of another officer who stated that of 
six to seven such arrests, three or four involved driving under 
the influence (R. 233, 268-69). That cross-examination, by 
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itself, says nothing about whether, as a factual matter, co-
commission of driving under the influence was a controlling or 
even necessary factor in the officers' decisions whether to 
arrest someone caught driving under suspension. 
Thus even assuming that defendant was not driving 
drunk, it still does not appear that her arrest was unusual on 
that basis alone. Both under a reasonable construction of Lopez, 
and under the novel theory implied by defendant, then, this 
arrest was not so unusual as to be improperly "pretextual." 
B. "Pretext Doctrine" Should be Abandoned, or Greatly 
Restricted in its Application. 
As a final observation, the State revisits the problems 
attendant to "pretext doctrine." The doctrine's flaws exist in 
its application to both temporary detentions and arrests, with at 
least one court rejecting a "pretext" challenge in the latter 
context. See United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 
1987) (en banc) (upholding bank robbery suspect's arrest on 
unrelated valid warrant). The following argument therefore 
applies to both temporary detentions and arrests. It applies to 
this particular arrest even if pretext doctrine might properly 
invalidate some other, highly unusual arrest for an obviously 
minor offense. Generally, the doctrine should be abandoned; at 
least, it should be tightly be restricted in application. 
1. Protection under Already-Settled Law. 
First, settled law already protects individuals against 
unreasonable police conduct attendant to both temporary 
detentions and arrests. Only reasonable suspicion or probable 
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cause permits a motor vehicle stop for a traffic offense. 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1400-
01 (1979). Such a stop must be limited in duration and scope to 
license and registration checks, a "computer check," and issuance 
of a citation. State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 
1990). A non-traffic, "level two" detention must also be 
supported by reasonable suspicion, and may "last no longer than 
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987) (quoting authority); 
accord Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.15, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1878 
n.15 (1968). In both cases, detention beyond the original 
purpose is allowed only if new, articulable reasonable suspicion 
arises. Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435.7 
Similarly, an arrest must be supported by probable 
cause. And even though an arrest more severely impairs its 
subject's liberty, the extent of that impact is also limited by 
7Utah cases purporting to endorse pretext doctrine in the 
context of temporary detentions have actually turned upon these 
settled "reasonable suspicion" and "scope of detention" principles. 
See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 n.3 (Utah 1990) (invalid 
traffic stop where no violation had in fact occurred); State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 978 (Utah App. 1988), disavowed on other 
grounds in Arroyo (same); State v. Lovearen, 798 P.2d 767, 771 n. 
10 (Utah App. 1990) (stop for "following too closely" was factually 
supported); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah App. 1990) 
(improper stop for mere avoidance of a non-emergency roadblock); 
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App. 1990) (valid stop 
for turn signal problem); State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah App. 
1989) (same); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1217 (Utah App. 1988) 
(invalid stop for registration tag that "looked funny"). Even 
United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir* 1988), cited by 
this Court in Sierra for its pretext analysis, involved a traffic 
stop that extended, without proper cause, well beyond its initial 
justification, see 864 F.2d at 1514. 
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law. The arrestee must be warned of the right to silence and the 
right to counsel, under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 
S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966). Any search incident to the arrest must 
be limited to the area within the arrestee's immediate control, 
or to areas from which hidden persons might mount an attack. See 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969); 
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990). Thus 
settled law already limits police conduct of both temporary 
detentions and arrests. Further individual protection, beyond 
the objective standards contained within these limits, will 
seldom, if ever, be necessary. 
The objective limits on the conduct of an arrest were 
met here. Defendant was lawfully stopped, whereupon she was 
confronted about, and admitted to, driving under suspension (R. 
205-06). Probable cause thus confirmed, defendant was arrested 
and promptly given her "Miranda" warnings. Incident to that 
arrest, only the areas within defendant's immediate control were 
searched, as set forth in State v. Harrison, 805 P. 2d 769, 784-
85 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). Such 
treatment was both permissible and properly limited in its scope, 
given the offense for which she was arrested. Compare State v. 
Parker, 834 P.2d 592 (Utah App. 1992) (gunpoint arrest and frisk 
of the defendant for speeding was not proper).8 
8The full facts of Parker—recent burglaries, nonpermissive 
use of an automobile, and apparent efforts to elude police— 
strongly suggest that the defendant could have been properly 
"stopped and frisked" as a burglary suspect. However, the Court 
reasonably held that the defendant could not be arrested on these 
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Thus protected by obeyed, objective limits on Russo's 
conduct, defendant has no need for further "pretext" protection. 
She drove an automobile, knowing that her license to do so had 
been suspended, in full view of a known police officer. She 
thereby effectively, if foolishly, invited Russo to arrest her. 
No sound constitutional principle demands that she be relieved of 
the consequence of that invitation. 
2. Officer Intent: the Pretext Paradox. 
Besides being unnecessary, pretext doctrine, as set 
forth in Lopez, creates paradoxical, self-contradictory law. The 
repeated "illegal motivation" reference in Lopez cannot refer to 
objective officer behavior. Defined by its root term, "motive," 
the word "motivation" refers to "an impulse, as an emotion, 
desire, or physiological need, acting as incitement to action." 
Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 772 (1984). But 
impulses, emotions, and desires have no existence except within 
the mind; even physiological needs and incitements lack meaning 
until they are perceived. Yet Lopez seemingly posits that such 
subjective mental processes can, by themselves, be "illegal." 
This is nonsense, yet it is defendant's argument here. 
She has no argument that Detective Russo violated the objective 
standards governing her arrest. Nevertheless, defendant argues, 
the arrest was illegal, solely because Russo happened to also 
hold a subjective, "unconstitutional" belief that she was 
involved in drug trafficking. 
facts alone. 
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The United States Supreme Court has squarely rejected 
this argument, "Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has 
occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer's 
actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him 
at the time, and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the 
time the challenged action was taken." Maryland v. Macon, 472 
U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S. Ct. 2778, 2783 (1985) (quotations and 
citations omitted) (emphasis added); accord Scott v. United 
States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-38, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 1723 (1978). The 
matter was explained most articulately by Justice White: 
We might wish that policemen would not act 
with impure plots in mind, but I do not 
believe that wish a sufficient basis for 
excluding, in the supposed service of the 
Fourth Amendment, probative evidence obtained 
by actions—if not thoughts—entirely in 
accord with the Fourth Amendment and all 
other constitutional requirements. In 
addition, sending state and federal courts on 
an expedition into the minds of police 
officers would produce grave and fruitless 
misallocation of judicial resources. 
Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565, 88 S. Ct. 660, 663 
(1968) (White, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari, 
joined by Harlan and Stewart, JJ.). 
Professor LaFave has characterized the foregoing view 
as "eminently sound." 1 W. LaFave Search & Seizure, § 1.4 at 85 
(2d Ed. 1987). It is equally sound under Article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution: like its federal counterpart, that 
provision should be deemed to protect citizens against improper 
police conduct, not against correct conduct attended by "impure 
thoughts" or disapproved "motivations." 
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3. An Undefinable "Objective" Test. 
Even redacting Lopez's paradoxical "illegal motivation" 
language, as this Court apparently did in Cruz, the "objective" 
pretext analysis retains an ill-defined definition of a 
pretextual detention or arrest. Under Lopez, a pretextual 
detention occurs when it is found that it would not be effected 
by a "reasonable officer." Such a finding, it is said, will be 
supported by a determination that the detention is outside the 
particular officer's "normal practice." 831 P.2d at 1049. 
However, Lopez offers no ready definition of "normal 
practice." As already set forth, even "less-than-usual" events 
are not necessarily "abnormal" or "unusual." So-called "normal" 
behavior, for instance, ranges from the tediously average to the 
eccentric. Statistical deviations from "normal" values—means, 
medians, and the like—are not unusual, but expected. Thus it 
cannot be said that an event that only occurs in a minority of 
instances that might trigger it is necessarily "unusual." 
Nevertheless, pretext doctrine, as formulated in Lopez, seems to 
require police officers and reviewing courts to know when an 
arrest or detention is sufficiently outside "usual" practice so 
as to be improper. 
Here, Russo's precise "usual" arrest rate for driving 
under suspension may be unusually low compared to officers 
generally. In the trial court, defendant argued that narcotics 
officers, like Russo, do not "usually" make traffic arrests, and 
that when they do so, they violate the constitution (R. 155). 
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However, the "reasonable officer" postulated in Lopez has not 
(yet) been parsed by specialty. Defendant's argument, however, 
seemingly requires special definitions for the behavior of many 
different hypothetical "reasonable officers." 
The Lopez majority also suggested that in a "clear cut" 
case, such as "driving eighty miles-per-hour in a school zone or 
consuming alcohol while driving," pretext analysis does not 
apply. 831 P.2d at 1050 n.17. "[C]ommon knowledge suggests that 
reasonable officers everywhere routinely stop such offenders." 
Id. However, "common knowledge" becomes far less useful when the 
violation in question is less "clear cut," as in driving five, 
ten, or fifteen miles per hour over the speed limit. The "common 
knowledge" of three different citizens, police officers, or even 
appellate judges in this regard might very well differ. 
Thus not even "objective" pretext doctrine provides 
usable guidance to police conduct, or to trial courts who have 
the front-line responsibility to review that conduct. Case law 
is little help, even on appeal—far afield from where the 
decisions to detain, arrest, or disregard individuals suspected 
of misbehavior are made. In short, the "objective" pretext test 
is, ultimately, highly subjective in nature. 
The workable, emerging view is that a detention, so 
long as authorized by law and carried out in accord with "scope" 
limitations, is constitutional.9 Among the courts adopting this 
9See United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1990), 
cert, denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 428 (1991); United States v. 
Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989), cert, denied, U.S. , 
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view, Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), is 
particularly persuasive. There the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals, sitting en banc, abandoned pretext analysis, which it 
had adopted five years earlier. 
The Texas court found that even the "modified objective 
approach" to pretext analysis, which appears identical to this 
Court's Lopez approach, "in practice . . . seems at worst 
unworkable and at best highly problematic . . .." Garcia, 827 
S.W.2d at 942. It returned to the rule that a traffic stop is 
valid whenever an offense is observed, "regardless of whatever 
the usual practices and standards of the local law enforcement 
agency are and regardless of the officer's subjective reasons for 
the detention." Ld. at 944. 
Utah courts need not repeat the failed Texas experiment 
with pretext doctrine. If retained at all, the doctrine should, 
again, be tightly restricted to those very rare situations where 
a full arrest is made in glaring departure from well-established, 
overwhelming past practice. 
4. The Utah Constitution. 
Defendant asks this Court to "vitalize" the pretext 
doctrine under the Utah Constitution (Opening Br. of Appellant at 
112 S. Ct. 428 (1991); United States v. Causev, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th 
Cir. 1987) (en banc); United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210 (3rd 
Cir.), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 833, 108 S. Ct. 110 (1987); State v. 
Mease, S.W.2d , 52 Cr. L. 1239 (Mo. Nov. 24, 1992); Garcia 
v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Scarbrouah v. 
State, So. 2d , No. CR 90-981, 1992 WL 21025 (Ala. Crim. 
App. Jan. 17, 1992) (not yet released for publication); State v. 
Olaiz, 100 Or. App. 380, 786 P.2d 734, review denied, 310 Or. 121-
22, 794 P.2d 793 (1990). 
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24). To the contrary, proper obedience to the Utah Constitution 
requires the rejection of pretext doctrine. 
Dissenting in Lopez, Judge Russon noted that Motor 
Vehicle Act section 41-1-17, applicable to both the Lopez 
detention and this arrest, created an affirmative duty on the 
part of law officers to apprehend traffic violators. 831 P.2d at 
1053 (Russon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He 
then pointed out that pretext doctrine creates a separation-of-
powers problem, by asking police and courts to trump legislative 
decisions, and decide for themselves which laws to follow. Id. 
at 1054. That problem is magnified under the Utah Constitution, 
which unlike its federal counterpart, spells out the separation-
of-powers rule: 
The powers of the government of the State 
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, 
and the Judicial; and no person charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to 
one of these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted. 
Utah Const. Art. V, § 1. Pretext doctrine, as advanced by 
defendant, thus amounts to a demand that this Court rewrite 
section 41-1-17, eliminating its directive that officers shall 
arrest traffic violators.10 Acquiescence in that demand, 
however, would itself violate the Utah Constitution. 
10As set forth earlier in footnote 5, such rewriting has now 
been apparently done by the legislature, but too late to strengthen 
defendant's "pretext" argument here. 
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5. Reasonable Expectations. 
The Lopez majority also suggested that motorists have 
"reasonable expectations" against being stopped for "minor" 
traffic violations. Cf.. Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1049 n.16. Such 
expectations may be reasonable in that they are borne out by 
usual experience; however, this creates no constitutional right 
against such stops. 
A motorist who speeds at five miles per hour over the 
posted limit, for example, is merely gambling—albeit with 
favorable odds—that he or she will not be stopped for the 
offense. When those odds fail, the motorist cannot complain of a 
constitutional violation. Even if the motorist subjectively 
"expected" not to be stopped, such expectation does not appear to 
be one that society can or should respect as constitutionally 
legitimate. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S. 
Ct. 507, 516 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (setting forth 
"expectation of privacy" test). 
Similarly here, it is difficult to imagine that even if 
defendant subjectively expected not to be arrested for driving 
under suspension, society would deem such expectation to be 
reasonable. To legitimize such expectation would give defendant 
a constitutional "right" to be a scofflaw. 
It appears more reasonable to expect even "minor" 
scofflaws to accept occasional legal sanctions in response. 
Those sanctions, and the inconvenience of being detained or 
arrested to impose them are, as already set forth, limited by 
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well-established, sound legal principles. Those principles apply 
equally to all "minor" offenders, including those also suspected 
of some other "major" offense. Only for the most extremely 
aberrant police practice, if ever, should pretext doctrine 
relieve such offenders of the consequences of their behavior. 
6. Hard Choices. 
Defendant cites a number of articles by Professor 
Burkoff, supporting pretext doctrine (Opening Br. of Appellant at 
20-23 & nn. 4, 6). Those articles represent one side of the 
debate between Professor Burkoff and Professor Haddad. That 
debate is chronicled in Butterfoss, Solving the Pretext Puzzle: 
The Importance of Ulterior Motives and Fabrications in the 
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment Pretext Doctrine, 79 Ky. L. J. 1 
(1990-91). By now it should surprise neither defendant nor this 
Court to learn that the State considers Professor Haddad's 
arguments more persuasive. 
Perhaps in the end, acceptance or rejection of pretext 
doctrine represents a "hard choice," c£. Butterfoss, 79 Ky L. J. 
at 11, as a policy decision, to be made by appellate courts. One 
might sympathize with defendant here, given that her arrest for a 
class C traffic misdemeanor has contributed to her present felony 
liability. It may seem a hard choice to let her drug conviction 
stand, when pretext doctrine might free her. However, in light 
of the difficulties with that doctrine, and the distinctive 
nature of the offense for which defendant was arrested, that 
choice should be less hard than it seems. 
40 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in issue here was arrived at by means that 
were well attenuated from defendant's arrest; this alone defeats 
her appeal. "Pretext" analysis, even if addressed and applied 
here, also does not help her. For these reasons, defendant's 
conviction for felony drug possession should be affirmed. 
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